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CONFLICTING INTERESTS OF ESTATE FIDUCIARIES
IN NEW YORK AND THE "NO FURTHER
INQUIRY" RULE
BY LOUIS C. HAGGERTYt
IN 1928, Judge Cardozo wrote the opinion of the New York Court of
Appeals in-the now famous case of Meinhard v. Salmon, which in-
volved the question of good faith among business associates. In it, he
phrased in unforgettable language the standard of conduct which is
applicable to all persons occupying positions of trust and particularly to
all estate fiduciaries. He said:
"A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market place.
Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then
the standard of behavior."'
This rule for the conduct of a fiduciary, whether expressed with the
felicity of language that Judge Cardozo employed, or by others, both
before and after him, is basic and fundamental. It permits of no excep-
tions or deviations, and may properly be the subject of universal appli-
cation. The extent to which this standard of conduct will be enforced
was illustrated more recently when Judge Conway stated that the pro-
hibition against self-dealing by a fiduciary did not depend upon any
question of fraud but was made absolute to avoid the possibility of fraud,
and to avoid the temptation of self-interest2 and that a fiduciary was
subject to surcharge if it placed itself in a position where its interest
"'was or might be in conflict with its duty."3
There has been annexed to this doctrine, however, and it is an
annexation and not an addition, another doctrine which may be called
the "no further inquiry" rule. Its history may be briefly recited. On
September 14, 1875, a man named Edgar Munson made a contract in
t Member of the New York Bar.
1. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 464, 165 N. E. 545, 546 (1928). Unfortunately
this was an expensive victory for the plaintiff, as the accounting proceedings filed in the
Surrogate's Court of New York County will reveal.
2. Matter of Ryan, 291 N. Y. 376, 405, 52 N. E. 2d 909, 922 (1943) (emphasis by
the court).
3. Id. at 407, 52 N. E. 2d at 913 (emphasis by the court).
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the State of New York with the Syracuse, Geneva and Corning Railroad
Company, whereby he agreed to sell to it, and the railroad company
agreed to buy from him certain bonds. Mr. Munson was at the time one
of a number of directors of the company. Later on, the latter refused
to make the purchase agreed upon and Mr. Munson sued for specific
performance. The Court of Appeals found no evidence of actual fraud
or collusion on the part of any one but nevertheless ruled that the contract
was not enforceable by Munson. Judge Andrews, writing for a unanimous
court, said that if a person occupying a position of trust made a contract
on behalf of the person to whom he bore a fiduciary relationship, with
himself individually, the court would not stop to inquire whether the
contract was fair or unfair. It would stop any inquiry as soon as the
fiduciary relationship was disclosed and would refuse to enforce it or
would set it aside at the instance of the party whom the fiduciary under-
took to represent, "without undertaking to deal with the question of
abstract justice in the particular case.' 4 Although this rule had the
laudable purpose of discouraging fraud by "taking away motive for its
perpetration, ' the deliberate refusal of a court to consider the abstract
justice of any case may seem surprising to some and possibly shocking
to others. But the courts have entertained no doubts about the validity
of the doctrine. Judge Cardozo himself had defended it, prior to Mein-
hard v. Salmon, on the ground that "only by this uncompromising rigidity
has the rule of undivided loyalty been maintained against disintegrating
erosion."6
The "no further inquiry" rule has several weaknesses. It may and
often does miss its real target, the faithless fiduciary, and hit the one
who has acted in the best of faith.' It may operate not to protect
beneficiaries from wrongdoers but to give them undue and undeserved
advantages over fiduciaries who thought they were obeying the rules. 8
For these and other reasons, it is not always enforced. Although it
4. Munson v. Syracuse, Geneva & Corning R.R. Co., 103 N. Y. 58, 74, 8 N. E. 355,
358 (1886).
5. Ten Eyck v. Craig, 62 N. Y. 406, 420 (1875).
6. Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y. 439, 444, 154 N. E. 303, 304 (1926).
7. Anyone who reads the cases on divided loyalty, will observe in the great majority
of them:
A-that the courts found either affirmative good faith or else no evidence of bad faith;
B-that in those cases in which bad faith appeared, a surcharge could have been made
without invoking the "no further inquiry" rule.
8. A fiduciary may in the best of faith engage in a series of transactions of identical
character, some resulting in profits and others in losses. If the court should later hold
that the transactions involved self-dealings, no inquiry will be made into the profits which
were made and they will not be applied to off-set the losses. This result, however, is not
limited to cases where the "no further inquiry" doctrine is applied.
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has been said that self-dealing in itself is against public policy, it is
not against public policy for a testator or settlor of a trust to authorize
a fiduciary to enter into transactions in which the fiduciary may have
an interest." In some cases, the testator or settlor has been responsible
for placing the fiduciary in a position of conflicting interests, and the
courts have been obliged in the interests of justice to inquire into the
facts and then to hold that there had been an implied waiver of the rule
against self-dealing.' 1 In some situations, it would seem that the courts
have refrained from enforcing the "no further inquiry" rule because they
peeked a little and saw that if it was enforced, the effect would be to
destroy the testamentary intent and to injure the very estate which the
court had to protect.
It may, therefore, be of interest to-consider, with respect to estate
fiduciaries:
A-Situations in which the rule against divided loyalty has been enforced.
B-Situations in which the rule against divided loyalty has not been enforced.
C-Situations in which the interests of the trust estate suggest that the
rule against divided loyalty be waived in order to get away from the
"no further inquiry" rule.
Tni ENFORCEMENT OF THE R ULE AGAINST DIVIDED LOYALTY
Transactions of Purchase and Sale
The doctrine is enforced with particular strictness when a fiduciary
buys from, or sells to himself individually, property belonging to his
trust estate. Good faith and sincerity are immaterial.'2 Even the fact
that the transaction may have been entered into by the fiduciary against
his own interest will not validate it.'3 A transaction in which only one
9. Matter of Long Island, Loan & Trust Co., 92 App. Div. 1, 87 N. Y. Supp. 65 (2d
Dep't 1904), aff'd, 179 N. Y. 520, 71 N. E. 1133 (1904).
10. Matter of Balfe, 245 App. Div. 22, 24, 280 N. Y. Supp. 128, 130 (2d Dep't 1935);
Matter of Durston, 297 N. Y. 64, 71, 74 N. E. 2d 310, 312 (1947). The waiver may be a
statutory one, as, for example, N. Y. Laws, 1917, c. 385.
11. As for example, Matter of Hubbell, 119 N. Y. L. J. 554 (Surr. CL Feb. 11, 1948).
12. Matter of Long Island Loan & Trust Co., 92 App. Div. 1, 87 N. Y. Supp. 65 (2d
Dep't 1907), afi'd, 179 N. Y. 520, 71 N. E. 1133 (1904). The "no further inquiry" rule
may be applied with substantial justice in many transactions of purchase and sale but not
universally. For example, a gift from a grantor-fiduciary to his trust and reported as such
for tax purposes, which takes the form of a sale to the trust of property at a price
admittedly below a readily realizable market value would come within the rule. Such a
transaction is entitled to at least an inquiry.
13. In Matter of Kilmer, 187 Misc. 121, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 51 (Surf. CL 1946), three
executors wished to accept an offer of $116,000.00 for a parcel of real estate, at a price
exceeding all appraisals and other bids. The fourth executor thought he could get a better
price from a chain-store company and agreed in writing that if he could not, and if, as
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of several fiduciaries has a private interest receives no different treatment
from one in which there is only one fiduciary.14 The fact that the sale
was made at public auction at which the fiduciary was the highest bidder
makes no difference.15 A transaction between a fiduciary and his or her
spouse is treated as a transaction between a fiduciary and himself or
herself,"0 and a sale by a fiduciary to his own child is likewise voidable."
And as a fiduciary cannot validly contract with a firm of which he is a
partner, 8 a sale by a fiduciary to his own firm will not stand up under
attack. As a matter of fact, a fiduciary who sells to or buys from any rela-
tive by blood or marriage or any business associate is asking for trouble.
It must be kept in mind constantly, and it is not easy to do so, that
factors such as complete honesty of purpose, adequacy of price, or a
desire in the best of faith to help the estate are not material. The test
is merely whether there "might be" a conflict of interest.
A transaction between a fiduciary and a corporation of which he is
an officer, as, for example, where a fiduciary buys a mortgage for his
trust from a corporation of which he is president and director constitutes
a violation of the rule." It is not necessary to "pierce the veil of cor-
porate entity." The existence of a conflict of interest is in itself sufficient
to void the deal.
Transactions between a corporate fiduciary and an associated corpo-
ration, albeit one with a separate legal entity, may be set aside or may
result in surcharges, if the circumstances are such that a conflict of
interest "may exist." 2° However, the fiduciary will not be surcharged
a result of the delay in accepting the offer of $116,000.00, the latter was withdrawn, he
would buy the property himself for that price. He had to make good on his agreement.
Upon a later accounting, the sale was rescinded. If, in the meanwhile, he had sold the
property at a profit and paid an income tax thereon, or if he had improved the property,
the attempt to aid the estate might have been highly expensive.
14. Munson v. Syracuse, Geneva & Corning R.R. Co., 103 N. Y. 58, 74, 8 N. E. 355,
358 (1886). The court said: "The law cannot accurately measure the influence of a trustee
with his associates, nor will it enter into the inquiry. . . . " Among other cases in which
only one of several trustees had an interest in transactions held voidable are: Matter of
Durston, 297 N. Y. 64, 74 N. E. 2d 310 (1947); Matter of Huffnagel, 258 App. Dlv. 1088,
18 N. Y. S. 2d 76 (2d Dep't 1940); Matter of Ewald, 266 App. Div. 799, 42 N. Y. S. 2d
39 (2d Dep't 1943).
15. Davoue v. Fanning, 2 John Ch. 252 (N. Y. 1816).
16. Ibid. Matter of Randolph, 134 N. Y. Supp. 1117 (Surr. Ct. 1911), aff'd, 150 App. Dlv.
902, 175 N. Y. Supp. 1138 (1st Dep't 1912); Matter of Fulton, 253 App. Div. 494, 2 N.
Y. S. 2d 917 (3d Dep't 1938); RESTATEMiENT, TRUSTS § 170 (1) (1935).
17. Matter of Segal, 170 Misc. 673, 11 N. Y. S. 2d 306 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
18. Matter of Meyers, 131 N. Y. 409, 417, 30 N. E. 135, 137 (1892).
19. Matter of Huffnagel, 258 App. Div. 1089, 18 N. Y. S. 2d 76 (2d Dep't 1940).
20. Matter of Ryan, 291 N. Y. 376, 52 N. E. 2d 909 (1943); Albright v. Jefferson
County Nat. Bank, 292 N. Y. 31, 53 N. E. 2d 753 (1944); Matter of Whitmore, 172
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for any commissions or profits which accrue to the associate, if the fidu-
ciary does not share in them.21 The conflict of interest may be other
than a financial one. Thus, a mortgage investment made by a corporate
fiduciary was set aside and charged to the fiduciary individually when
it appeared that the mortgaged property was subject to restrictive cove-
nants which were controlled by the owners of adjacent property, among
whom was an executive officer of the fiduciary.2 2 A court has held that
an executor was guilty of misconduct when he participated in buying
property from a corporation in which the estate had an interest, although
the sale took place before he had qualified as executor.' And if a fiduciary
has been guilty of self-dealing, there can be no valid ratification of the
transaction unless the beneficiaries are in full possession of all the perti-
nent facts involved.24
Clerical errors, however, will be taken into consideration. The court
refused to surcharge a fiduciary for selling a mortgage to one of its
trusts upon proof that it had intended to buy the mortgage in the first
instance for the trust but by mistake acquired it in its own name.? A
fiduciary may also sell the asset of one trust to itself as trustee of another
trust if the sales is at a fair price.20 And, if there are reasons why a
trustee should be permitted to enter into a transaction of purchase and
sale with itself, the court may authorize it and thus validate it.'
A case recently decided by Surrogate Griffiths in Westchester County
illustrates how easy it is for a fiduciary to find himself in conflict with
a trust estate created by his own funds. The trustee in question had
transferred all his assets to a holding corporation, including the apart-
ment in which he resided and a commercial building in which his business
corporation was a tenant, and then gave half of the stock of the holding
company to his wife. She died, leaving her residuary estate, which con-
sisted principally of the stock which her husband had given her, in trust
for the life of her husband; made him the income beneficiary and ap-
Misc. 2.77, 15 N. Y. S. 2d 379 (Surr. Ct. 1939) ; Matter of Jones, 155 Mim. 315, 280 N. Y.
S. 2d 521 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
21. Albright v. Jefferson County Nat. Bank, 292 N. Y. 31, 53 N. E. 2d 753 (1944);
Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y. 439, 154 N. E. 303 (1929).
22. Matter of Lewisohn, 294 N. Y. 596, 63 N. E. 2d 589 (1945).
23. M Iatter of Fensterer, 79 N. Y. S. 2d 427 (Surr. Ct. 1948).
24. Matter of Young, 249 App. Div. 495, 293 N. Y. Supp. 97 (2d Dep't 1937).
25. Matter of Montant, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 318 (Surr. Ct. 1947), affd, 274 App. Div. 757,
So N. Y. S. 2d 357 (Ist Dep't 1948).
26. Matter of Kramer, 172 Misc. 598, 15 N. Y. S. 2d 700 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
27. Matter of Smythe, 36 N. Y. S. 2d 605 (Surr. Ct. 1942).
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pointed him and a trust company as the trustees. The husband continued
to live in the apartment house owned by the corporation and his business
corporation continued as a tenant of the commercial building. Other
beneficiaries sought to remove him as trustee on the ground that a conflict
of interest existed between his position as a tenant in the two buildings
and his trust status as his own landlord. Fortunately, for the interests
of justice, the court did not stop its inquiry when the fiduciary relation-
ship was disclosed but ruled that the widow must have foreseen that a
conflict of interest would arise and had waived it."
The Right of a Corporate Fiduciary to Purchase or Hold Its Own Stock
The right of a corporate fiduciary to administer shares of its own stock
as part of the assets of a trust estate is a question on which the courts
of various states ate in disagreement. Consequently and regardless of
whether the practice is advisable or inadvisable, it is obvious that a
bank doing business in the state of A cannot well be the subject of strong
moral condemnation for doing something that would be permitted to a
bank doing business in the state of B.
The attitude taken by the courts of New York on the issue has a
curious history. In 1934, Surrogate Taylor of Orange County refused
to surcharge a corporate fiduciary for buying and retaining shares of its
own stock when acting under a will which permitted it to engage in self-
dealing and the Appellate Division upheld him,2" although Judge Lazansky
wrote a strong dissent. The particular language of the will serves to
keep the case from being a precedent on the main issue. But the court
enunciated the general doctrine that a waiver of the rule against self-
dealing does not impinge public policy or involve "the doing of anything
malum in se or malum prohibitum."30 Just about the same time, the
Appellate Division of the Fourth Department upheld the retention by
a corporate fiduciary of shares of its own stock when acting under a will
which directed that the stock should be held and divided among the
trusts created by the will and should not be disposed of until it became
28. Matter of Hubbell, 119 N. Y. L. J. 554 (Surr. Ct. Feb. 11, 1948).
29. Matter of Balfe, 245 App. Div. 22, 280 N. Y. Supp. 128 (2d Dep't 1935). The
will contained the following provision:
"I furthermore authorize and direct that my said Executor and Trustee may freely act
under all or any of the powers of this Will given in all matter concerning my estate and
the trusts herein created without the necessity of obtaining the consent or permission
of any person interested therein or the consent or approval of any court, notwithstanding
that such Executor and Trustee may also be acting or interested either individually or
as trustee of other trusts or as agent for other persons or corporation interested in the
same mnatter."
30. Id. at 24, 280 N. Y. Supp. at 130.
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necessary to do so to settle the estate. Here, also, the language of the
will created a special situation. It is interesting to note however that
the brief filed by the objectants limited the issue to negligence and did
not refer to the issue of divided loyalty."
In 1936, the following year, the Appellate Division of the Second
Department passed upon the right of a corporate fiduciary to buy shares
of its own stock when acting under an inter vivos trust agreement. Here,
the objectants urged that it was contrary to public policy for a corporate
fiduciary to buy its own stock. The trustee claimed that the settlor's
father, who had been her agent in establishing the trust, had approved of
the investment. The trial court dismissed the objection and the Appellate
Division of the Second Department affirmed in a per curiam opinion in
which it made no reference whatsoever to the issue of divided loyalty,
cleared the fiduciary of negligence and held affirmatively that the settlor's
agent had approved the transaction, and that consequently the objectants
were estopped to attack it. Costs were awarded to the trustee, to be
paid personally by the adult appellants. The Court of Apeals denied
leave to appeal.3 - Perhaps the most interesting feature of this, the
Ellinger case, is that the only testimony upon which the Appellate Di-
vision could have based its finding of ratification and approval was testi-
mony which the trial court had stricken out as immaterial.
In 1937, Surrogate Foley decided a case in which the corporate fiduciary
was restricted to legal investments except to the extent of being per-
mitted to retain any securities which the testator had owned. Among
them were shares of stock of a trust company which the corporate fidu-
ciary retained. Four years later, the trustee merged with the trust com-
31. Matter of Roche, 245 App. Div. 192, 281 N. Y. Supp. 77 (4th Dep't 1935).
32. Ellinger v. Brooklyn Trust Co., 248 App. Div. 897, 290 N. Y. Supp. 616 (2d Dep't
1936), leave to appeal denied, 273 N. Y. 677 (1936).
The only portion of the record which the attorneys for the trustee referred in their
brief in support of the claim that the settior's agent had approved of the transaction
consisted of one question and answer of an officer of the bank and the colloquy which
followed:
(Defendant's Counsel)
"Q. I now ask you particularly, Mr. McDonald, with respect to the rights to subscribe
to the Brooklyn Trust Company stock as enumerated in Schedule A, Part I and ask you
whether or not the Brooklyn Trust Company as trustee was requested to purchase those
rights?
"A. My recollection is that Mr. Eshbaugh (The settlor's father) expressed a desire to
have some Brooklyn Trust Company stock into this trust. I am speaking now from
memory."
(Plaintiff's Counsel)
"I move to strike out now the answers with respect to Mr. Eshbaugb.
"The Court: I cannot see that it has anything to do with this case so I grant the motion.
"(Defendant's Counsel): I respectfully except."
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pany whose shares it held, and upon the merger received and retained
shares of its own stock which later depreciated in value. It was sur-
charged with the loss upon the ground that the two institutions were of
entirely different types and that the right to retain the stock of the
trust company did not include the right to retain the stock of the
commercial bank with which it merged. Like the interest of Mr. Sherlock
Holmes in the barking dog because it had not barked, the case is of
interest on the right of a trustee to hold its own stock because the court
did not make any mention of this factor. 3
No reported case on the topic, at least of any importance, seems to
have been decided thereafter until 1942, when the Surrogate of Lewis
County upheld the retention by a corporate trustee of shares of its own
stock under a will which authorized the retention of any securities left
by the testator, even if non-legal. The attack was based on negligence
and not on divided loyalty and the Appellate Division of the Fourth De-
partment found no difficulty in affirming the ruling.34
Around this time, two other cases were being litigated, both of which
were to go to the Court of Appeals and which may be considered
together. In Central Hanover Bank v. Russell, the corporate fiduciary
became successor trustee of an inter-vivos trust, which was unrestricted
as to investments. The trust was irrevocable but the settlor retained
power of appointment over the disposition of the principal of the trust.
The original trustee had purchased for the trust some shares of stock
of the successor trustee which the latter retained when it took over. In
October 1929, it purchased 500 additional shares of its own stock. On
a subsequent accounting, the investment was challenged squarely on the
proposition that the purchase by a trustee of its own stock was a vio-
lation of the rule against divided loyalty. The successor trustee offered
evidence in support of its claim that the transaction had been approved
by the grantor of the trust and her agent but since the grantor, her agent
and the bank officer who handled the matter had died prior to the trial,
the evidence before the referee was necessarily incomplete. The plaintiff,
however, established that it was not its policy to invest trust funds in its
own stock, unless requested to do so by someone interested in the trust.8
Probably because of the death of all three parties to the transaction,
the referee went outside the record to the extent of stating at the hearing
that he had known the deceased bank officer and was sure he would not
33. Matter of Rolston, 162 Misc. 194, 294 N. Y. Supp. 112 (Surr. Ct. 1937).
34. Matter of Easton, 178 Misc. 611, 35 N. Y. S. 2d 546 (Surr. Ct. 1942), aff'd, 266
App. Div. 713, 41 N. Y. S. 2d (4th Dep't 1943).
35. It was the practice of the trustee in the Ellinger case, at the time of making the
investment complained of, to purchase its own stock for its trusts.
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have bought the stock of his own bank for the trust without the consent
of the settlor 6 The referee went further, moreover, and dismissed the
objections to the investment on the law as well as on the facts. The
Appellate Division of the Second Department affirmed without opinion
on May 4, 1942 1
In City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Cannon,3s the corporate fiduciary
was acting under a revocable inter-vivos trust and was not restricted to
"legals." It received from the settlor shares of stock of another bank,
with which it later affiliated and it continued to retain the shares
of the affiliated company, admittedly at the express direction and insis-
tance of the grantor. Upon a later accounting, the Appellate Division
of the Second Department held that the retention by a corporate fiduciary
of its own stock violated the rule against divided loyalty, but that the
trustee before it should not be surcharged because of the acquiescence of
the settlor and of the income beneficiary in the investment. This decision
was handed down on June 29, 1942, eight weeks after it had affirmed the
Russell case.
The Russell case was argued in the Court of Appeals on the 11th day
of January, 1943V9 The brief of the objectant was based largely on the
ruling of the Appellate Division in the Cannon case that the retention by
a corporate fiduciary of its own stock was a violation of the rule against
divided loyalty. Hence, the issue of divided loyalty was squarely before
the Court of Appeals which affirmed without opinion the dismissal of
the objection to the transaction complained of. It seems fair to state that
this affirmance, in the face of the ruling of the Appellate Division in the
Cannon case, and the prior refusal of the Court of Appeals to grant leave
to appeal in the Ellinger case, where the only testimony as to ratification
had been stricken out by the trial court as immaterial, tended to indicate
that the Court of Appeals did not consider that the retention and perhaps
even the purchase by a corporate fiduciary of its own stock violated the
rule against divided loyalty.
Two months after the Russell case was affirmed, Surrogate F'oley up-
held the right of a corporate fiduciary to retain its own stock when acting
under a testamentary power to retain the decedent's own investment,
noting in addition that there had been a long time association between
the bank and the family of the testatrix.40
36. Mr. Justice Stareleigh's ruling in Bardel v. Pickwich that what the soldier said
was not evidence, might be applied to this comment. But it makes good sense nevertheless.
37. Central Hanover Bank v. Russell, 264 App. Div. 771, 35 N. Y. S. 2d 276 (2d
Dep't 1942).
38. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Cannon, 264 App. Div. 429, 35 N. Y. S. 2d 870
(3d Dep't 1942).
39. Central Hanover Bank v. Russell, 290 N. Y. 593, 594, 48 N. E. 2d 674 (1943).
40. Mlatter of Schell, 109 N. Y. L. J. 2110 (Surr. CL May 29, 1943).
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In November 1943, the Court of Appeals decided the Cannon case and
in its opinion held flatly that the purchase and retention by a corporate
fiduciary of its own stock was a violation of the rule against divided
loyalty. It is true that it affirmed the judgment appealed from and re-
fused to surcharge the trustee before it upon the ground that since the
trust was revocable by the grantor, who had ratified the investment under
attack, the objectants were estopped to criticize it, but this did not serve
to weaken its ruling on the basic issue.4
However, the Surrogates of New York County did not interpret the
Cannon case as a prohibition against the retention by a corporate trustee
of its own stock, when acting under a testamentary authorization to keep
the securities owned by a testator at his death. Following the Cannon
decision, Surrogate Foley upheld such retention in at least two cases,
42
41. City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Cannon, 291 N. Y. 125, 51 N. E. 2d 674 (1943).
The opinion of the court makes evident how difficult it is to evaluate an affirmance without
opinion. In the official report of the Russell case, the digest of the fact and issues ends
with the following:
"In over-ruling the guardian's objections the referee stated that he was unable to find
either that the purchase and retention of the stock were improper and in bad faith as a
matter of fact or were illegal as a matter of law."
When this is followed by "Judgment affirmed with costs payable out of the trust fund.
No opinion," it.is submitted that one is apt to think that the affirmance was on both the
facts and the law. But the opinion of the court in the Cannon case described its holding
in the Russell case as being to the effect that when the settlor of a trust who had retained
a power of appointment over the principal of a trust, had approved of an investment made
by a trustee, the appointees of the power were precluded from objecting to it, which
limits the affirmance to the precise facts before the court.
42. Matter of Frissell, 111 N. Y. L. J. 1565 (Surr. Ct. April 22, 1944). The will con-
tained the following provisions:
"I hereby authorize and empower my Executors to retain and transfer to themselves as
Trustees of the trust created by this my Will, and my Trustee to receive and retain as a
part of the principal of said trusts, any securities or other form of property or investments
of which I may die seized or possessed, without regard to the proportion which any invest-
ment or investments of a similar character may bear to the entire amount of my estate
or of the trust funds, and notwithstanding that the same may not be such as are authorized
by law for the investment of trust funds."
Matter of Ryan, 186 Misc. 688, 57 N. Y. S. 2d 462 (Surr. Ct. 1945). The will provided
as follows:
"I hereby give my executors and trustees full power and authority in their discretion
to hold and retain any property coming to them under my will in the same form of invest-
ment as that in which it may exist at the time of my death although it may not be of the
character of investments permitted by law to trustees."
In addition, the testator wrote a letter to his trustees, requesting them to retain his
securities unless there was such a change of circumstances as to lead them to believe that
he himself would have changed his mind about keeping them.
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Surrogate Delehanty in at least one case43 and Surrogate Collins in at
least one case." In Kings County, Surrogate MlcGarey held that when
a testator created trusts, consisting of shares of stock of the bank which
he appointed as the trustee thereof, and directed that upon the termina-
tion of each trust, the trustee should deliver "the said shares of stock"
to the remainderman, he indicated his intention that the fiduciary should
retain its own stock.4 5
In the summer of 1947, the Court of Appeals decided the Durston
case.46 The testator owned, among other assets, shares in a bank of
which he was a director and which his father had helped to incorporate.
He gave his residuary estate, which included the bank stock to three
trustees, the bank itself, his brother-in-law who was its president, and
his attorney, and authorized them:
"... to hold, care for, manage and control the same, to sell and convert into
money any part of all thereof, without the authorization or approval of any
court, to invest or reinvest the same, or portions thereof, in such interest bearing
or income producing securities or property as to the said trustees in the
exercise of their discretion, may seem best, with all the authority and powers
in connection with the same, I would possess, if living."
They retained the bank stock left to them and bought more shares when
the capital of the bank was increased. There was a substantial loss on
the investment for which they were surcharged in the courts below. The
Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that the investment powers
above quoted did not constitute a waiver of the rule against divided
loyalty. It said that if the testator intended that the investment jowers
so given to the trustees could be exercised without regard to the rule
against divided loyalty, the authority should have been stated. It is,
however, difficult to conceive of a more comprehensive grant of invest-
ment power in every respect than.to give "all the authority and powers
I would possess, if living." This alone, to say nothing of the col-
lateral facts in the case, serves to make Judge Fuld's dissent convincing.
The court indicated clearly, however, and it is an important dictum,
that if the stock of the corporate fiduciary had come into the hands of
43. Matter of Stillman, 53 N. Y. S. 2d 718 (Surr. Ct. 1945). The will gave to the trustees
"full power and authority, in their discretion, to hold and retain any property coming to
them under this will in the same form of investment as that in vhich they may receive
it from my executors, although it may not be of the character of investments now per-
mitted by law to trustees."
In addition, the trustees received and filed the express consent of the beneficiaries to
the retention of the stock of the corporate trustee.
44. Matter of Von Volkenburgh, 116 N. Y. L. J. 83 (Surr. CL July 15, 1946).
45. Matter of Edminster, 113 N. Y. L. J. 1972 (Surr. CL May 23, 1945).
46. Matter of Durston, 297 N. Y. 64, 74 N. E. 2d 310 (1947).
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the fiduciaries after April 1, 1938, which was the effective date of Section
111 (6) of the Decedent Estate Law47 and of Section 21 (6) of the
Personal Property Law,48 the trustees would have had enjoyed the statu-
tory authority to retain it, and that the trustee in the Cannon case would
have been likewise protected by those statutes, had the time element been
different in that case also. It might, of course, be argued that since the
statutes referred to were substantially codifications of a doctrine long
established by the Court of Appeals itself,49 the right of a corporate
fiduciary to retain shares of its own stock received from the testators
estate existed before as well as after April 1, 1938.
The Durston case left in doubt the question whether the right of a
corporate fiduciary to retain its own stock was included in a testamentary
direction to retain the securities owned by the testator. The doubt arose
in part from the fact that the court changed the wording of its opinion
in the Durston case. In the opinion first made public, the court said
that if the testator had intended to permit his trustees to disregard the
"fundamental rule of absolute loyalty and fidelity prohibiting any pur-
chase or retention of securities involving a divided loyalty, the authority
should have been explicitly stated by an express grant of power to retain
the shares of the corporate trustee and to purchase additional shares."
But later, the court omitted the word "explicitly" and the entire clause
"by an express grant of power to retain the shares of the corporate trustee
and to purchase additional shares." Consequently, the opinion now reads
that "If the testator intended that all these things could be done without
regard to the fundamental rule of absolute loyalty and fidelity prohibiting
any purchase or retention of securities involving a divided loyalty, the
authority should have been stated.""0 Any number of interpretations
can be placed upon the revised language, particularly in the light of the
elisions referred to.
In any event, the doubt was soon dispelled. In April 1948, the Court
of Appeals decided the Ridings case 1 which involved the retention by a
corporate trustee of shares of its own stock which had been owned by
the testator, who had provided in his will that:
47. N. Y. DECEDENTS ESTATE LAW § 111 (6) provides as follows:
"No fiduciary shall be liable for any loss incurred with respect to any investment not
eligible by law for the investment of trust funds if such ineligible investment was received
by such fiduciary pursuant to the terms of the will, deed, decree of court or other instru-
ment creating the fiduciary relationship, or if such ineligible investment was eligible when
received, or when the investment was made by the fiduciary; provided such fiduciary exer-
cises due care and prudence in the disposition or retention of any such ineligible investment."
48. N. Y. PERS. PROP. LAW § 21 (6) is to the same effect.
49. Matter of Weston, 91 N. Y. 502, 508 (1883).
50. Matter of Durston, 97 N. Y. 64, 72 N. E. 2d 310, 313 (1947).
51. Matter of Ridings, 297 N. Y. 417, 79 N. E. 2d 735 (1948).
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"... said Trustee, in the investment of said trust funds, shall not be confined to
investments legal for trust funds in the State of New York, but may continue
any investment as left by me or may sell the same and invest said funds in
such investments and securities as to it, through its proper officer or officers,
shall seem best in its, his or their own proper discretion" 5 2
The court held that this general power to retain any securities which
the decedent left was sufficient to justify a corporate trustee to retain its
own stock, which, it might be noted, was what Surrogate Moran of Lewis
County had held on June 12, 194211 and what Surrogate Foley had held
on May 29, 1943.1"
The pertinent doctrines relative to the administration by a corporate
fiduciary of shares of its own stock may perhaps be summarized as
follows:
A-They may not be retained nor purchased without statutory or testa-
mentary authority to do so.
B-Section 111 (6) of the Decedent Estate Law and Section 21 (6) of the
Personal Property Law seems to constitute statutory authority as to
retention, if the stock is received on or after April 1, 1938 in the
manner prescribed by those statutes.
C-A general power in a will or trust indenture to retain securities received
from the testator or settlor is sufficient to authorize the retention of the
corporate fiduciary's own stock.
D-A general power to invest in non-legal securities, no matter how broad
and sweeping, is not sufficient to permit a fiduciary to purchase sbares
of its own stock. There must appear, in addition, an intention to waive
the rule against divided loyalty. Whether this intention must be express
or whether it may be implied from the language used is in doubt.5
It will be noted from the foregoing that the provisions of A, B, and C
will apply with equal force and effect to all other non-legal securities.
The only rule applicable to the administration of the stock of a corporate
fiduciary which is not equally applicable to other non-legal investments
is D.
There are, however, other matters for consideration. The right of a
52. Id. at 418, 79 N. E. 2d at 735.
53. Matter of Easton, 178 Misc. 611, 35 N. Y. S. 2d 546. (Surr. Ct. 1942), atd, 266
App. Div. 713, 41 N. Y. S. 2d (4th Dep't 1943).
54. Matter of Schell, 109 N. Y. L. J. 2110 (Surr. CL May 29, 1943).
55. It is obvious from Matter of Durston, 297 N. Y. 64, 74 N. E. 2d 310 (1947), that
a testamentary appointment as executor or trustee of a bank or trust company whose stock
is owned by the testator, does not constitute an implied waiver of the rule against divided
loyalty. It might well be so held, however, under the excellent rulings on implied waiver
to be found in Matter of Hubbell, 119 N. Y. L. J. 554 (Surr. Ct. Feb. 11, 1948) and Matter
of Cowen, 148 Misc. 35, 265 N. Y. Supp. 40 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
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trustee merely to retain its own stock, whether testamentary or statutory,
does not include the right to acquire additional shares upon an increase
of capital, at least if Surrogate Wingate's decisions on that general
question are adopted by other courts." And if the fiduciary merges with
another bank, the question of its right to retain the new stock must be
decided in accordance with the general doctrines applicable to such a
situation.57 In a recent case, it appeared that the testatrix authorized
her corporate trustee to retain the investments which she left, which in-
cluded shares of the trustee bank. Later on, the trustee merged with
another bank. Surrogate Collins authorized the retention of the stock
of the merged institutions, applying the capitalization test and pointing
out that both banks had only one class of stock, which was not subjected
to the lien of any bonds or the priority of any other class of stock."
The right of a trustee to retain or purchase its own stock does not, of
course, give it any immunity from maladministration of the investment.
As a matter of fact, a corporate fiduciary will be held to a particularly
high degree of responsibility in administering its own stock. An indi-
vidual who held as trustee, shares of the bank of which he was president,
was charged with knowledge of all the facts concerning the bank,59 and
there is no reason to doubt that a corporate fiduciary will be charged with
similar knowledge, not because it is a corporate trustee but because it
necessarily knows all about itself.
It might also be mentioned at this point that a national bank which
holds as sole trustee, shares of its own stock, may not vote the stock
for the election of directors, except in accordance with the directions of
any grantor or beneficiary who has reserved the right to give such direc-
56. Matter of Davidson, 134 Misc. 769, 236 N. Y. Supp. 437 (Surr. Ct. 1929), aff'd,
230 App. Div. 867, 245 N. Y. Supp. 731 (2d Dep't 1930) ; Matter of Blake, 146 Misc. 776,
263 N. Y. Supp. 317 (Surr. Ct. 1933); Matter of McCafferty, 147 Misc. 179, 264 N. Y.
Supp. 38 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
57. The leading case is Mertz v. Guaranty Trust Co., 247 N. Y. 137, 159 N. E. 888
(1928). In the Rolston case, the court held that the City Bank Farmers Trust Company as
trustee, could not, under the Mertz decision, retain stock of the National City Bank, and
did not refer to any issue of divided loyalty. In the Cannon case, the court held that the
City Bank Farmers Trust Company, as trustee, could not, under the rule against divided
loyalty, retain stock of the National City Bank and did not refer to the Mertz decision. One
safe deduction to be drawn from this is that the lawyer's life, like the policeman's, is not
a happy one.
58. Matter of Read, 120 N. Y. L. J. 239 (Surr. Ct. Aug. 12, 1948). This "capitaliza-
tion" test was applied by Surrogate Delehanty in Matter of Erwin, 19 N. Y. S. 2d 863
(Surr. Ct. 1939).
59. Matter of Richardson, 149 Misc. 192, 266 N. Y. Supp. 388 (Surr. Ct. 1928), modi-
fled and aff'd, 229 App. Div. 738, 241 N. Y. Supp. 890 (2d Dep't 1930), rev'd on stipulation
and consent and not as an adjudication on the merits of the appeal, 255 N. V. 632, 175 N.
E. 346 (1931).
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tions. If there is more than one trustee, the other trustee or trustees vote
the stock, and the corporate trustee has no voice as to how it is voted.co
The rule adopted by the Court of Appeals, that the retention by a
corporate fiduciary of its own stock violates the rule against divided
loyalty follows the Illinois and Ohio rule,"' but is not the universal rule.
New Jersey and Pennsylvania think differently and permit a trustee to
hold its own stock.62
Conflict of Interest Arising Out of Contracts of Employment
When a fiduciary seeks to obtain compensation other than statutory
commissions for services rendered by him, which arise either directly or
indirectly out of his fiduciary position, he has to overcome two doctrines
which are well established by the courts of this state over a long period
of time. The first one is that it is the law of New York that an executor
or administrator who continues to manage or operate the business of
the decedent is not entitled to any salary for his services in so doing and
must content himself with his statutory commissions. This is true in
spite of the fact that the testator has not only authorized but has directed
that his executors continue his business.6 The doctrine has been applied
in cases where it appeared that the fiduciary had rendered the same ser-
vices to the decedent at a salary during his lifetime, 4 and when the
operations resulted in a profit to the estate."5 The courts enforce the
rule even if the attitude of the beneficiaries is "ungracious""o and regard-
less of the hardship which may result.6
7
The second hurdle to overcome is that of conflict of interest. If a
60. REv. STAT. § 5144 (1875), as amended, 49 STAT. 704, 710 (1935), 12 U. S. C.
§ 61 (1940).
61. In Illinois: People ex rel. Kerner v. Canton National Bank, 283 MII. App. 418, 6
N. E. 2d 220 (1937). In Ohio: In re Stone, 138 Ohio St. 293, 34 N. E. 2d 7SS (1941).
62. In New Jersey: Matter of Griggs, 125 N. 3. Eq. 73, 4 A. 2d 59 (Prerog. CL 1939),
aff'd sub noin. In re Patterson Nat. Bank, 127 N. J. Eq. 362, 12 A. 2d 705 (Ct. Err. &
App. 1940); Matter of Riker, 124 N. J. Eq. 28, 1 A. 2d 13 (Prerog. Ct. 1938), affd, 125
N. J. Eq. 350, 5 A. 2d 685 (Ct. Err. & App. 1939); Matter of Oathout, 25 N. J. Misc. 186,
52 A. 2d 42 (Orphans Ct. 1947). In Pennsylvania: Matter of Greenawalt, 343 Pa. 413,
21 A. 2d 890 (1941) ; Matter of Shipley, 337 Pa. 571, 12 A. 2d 343 (1940).
63. Matter of Hayden, 54 Hun 197, 7 N. Y. Supp. 313 (Sup. Ct. 1889); Matter of
Froelich, 122 App. Div. 440, 107 N. Y. Supp. 173 (2d Dep't 1907), aff'd, 192 N. Y. 566,
85 N1T. E. 1110 (1908); Matter of Rosenberg, 251 N. Y. 115, 167 N. E. 190 (1929).
64. Matter of Ferrante, 190 Misc. 537, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 728 (Surr. Ct. 1947); Matter of
Hayden, 54 Hun 197, 7 N. Y. Supp. 315 (Sup. Ct. 1889).
65. Matter of Ferrante, 190 Misc. 537, 74 N. Y. S. 2d 778 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
66. Matter of Peck, 79 App. Div. 296, 80 N. Y. Supp. 76 (3d Dep't 1903), afj'd, 177
N. Y. 538, 69 N. E. 1129 (1903). The use by the court of the word "ungracious" is some-
what of an understatement.
67. Matter of Hayden, 54 Hun 197, 7 N. Y. Supp. 313 (Sup. Ct. 1889).
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fiduciary renders service to an estate or to a corporation in which the
estate has an interest, for a compensation other than his statutory com-
missions, he is technically occupying a position where his own interest
conflicts with his duties. In the Pyle case, 8 which is probably the leading
case in this state on the subject, the decedent and his brother were part-
ners in a business under an agreement which provided that upon the death
of either, the business was to be incorporated and the stock divided
equally between the survivor and the estate of the deceased partner.
The will of the testator placed his estate in trust and appointed the widow
and the surviving brother-partner as trustees. The corporation agreed
upon was organized and the stock distributed as agreed. Thus, the surviv-
ing brother became the owner of one-half of the stock for his own account
and the owner of the other half as co-trustee with the widow. He insisted
that he be elected president at a substantial salary and although he
subsequently reduced it, the widow and co-trustee eventually sought to
remove him as trustee. In holding that the complaint set forth a cause
of action, the court said that it was not necessary to determine whether
the fiduciary had acted in bad faith or had received more in salary than
he would have received, had he not been a trustee; that since his salary
would diminish by one-half what would otherwise have been received by
the beneficiary of his trust, he could not act in conflict with his trust. It
he would have received had he not been a trustee; that since his salary
did not reduce the income of the trust pro tanto to its interest in the cor-
poration. But the argument that a salary would have to be paid to some-
one else for doirig what the fiduciary had done, does not satisfy the
courts." And lawyers would do well to bear in mind that if they use
stock held by themselves as fiduciaries to become attorneys for cor-
porations in which their estates are interested and if the beneficiaries
complain about the fees which they charge the corporation, the reason-
ableness of the fees may not be a factor for consideration."0
The rule, however, is not inflexible and the courts will sometimes em-
ploy discretion in allowing fiduciaries to serve as salaried employees of a
corporation in which the estate is interested, This may be because the ser-
vices paid for are entirely outside the ordinary scope of the duties of an
executor or trustee,71 or because the fiduciary had received a salary
68. Pyle v. Pyle, 137 App. Div. 568, 573, 122 N. Y. Supp. 256, 260 (1st Dep't 1910),
aff'd, 199 N. Y. 538, 92 N. E. 1099 (1910). Other illustrations of the application of this
doctrine will be found in Matter of Kirkman, 143 Misc. 342, 256 N. Y. Supp. 495 (Surr.
Ct. 1932); Matter of Grossman, 157 Misc. 164, 283 N. Y. Supp. 323 (Surr. Ct. 1935).
69. Matter of Popp, 123 App. Div. 2, 107 N. Y. Supp. 277 (2d Dep't 1907).
70. Matter of Hirsch, 116 App. Div. 367, 101 N. Y. Supp. 893 (1st Dep't 1906), aff'd,
188 N. Y. 584, 81 N. E. 1165 (1907).
71. Matter of McCord, 2 App. Div. 324, 326, 37 N. Y. Supp. 852, 853 (1st Dep't 1896)
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during the life time of the decedent,7 2 or because irregularities in manag-
ing the affairs of a family corporation can be overlooked a But even
where the practice is permitted, the salaries are closely checked in relation
to services rendered. One testator directed that his business enterprises,
conducted in corporate form, should be continued separately from the
administration of his estate. His widow, the executrix, was elected presi-
dent of the corporation at a salary because of her knowledge of the
business and the salary paid to her originally was approved by the court.
But she remarried and the second husband was also employed at a salary
for services which duplicated to some extent the work of the executrix
herself. Consequently, she was surcharged for an amount equal to the
excess of the joint salaries over her original salary. 4
Directors fees paid to fiduciaries by corporations in which the estate
is interested appear to be permissible in New York."' Mention is made
of this because an English court directed a trustee to repay to his trust
estate the fees he had received from the directorship which he acquired
through the stock of the estate.7"
The Restatement of the Law of Trusts states that a fiduciary who
procures his election as an officer of a corporation at a salary in excess
of the value of his services is accountable to his trust for all or part of
his salary but that it is not necessarily improper for him to be paid the
value of necessary services.77 The question of accounting for any such
compensation has its own difficulties. If the salary is excessive, the
fiduciary should, for his own protection, first repay to the corporation
the amount of the excess, and, if necessary, account to the trust for the
Matter of Berri, 130 Misc. 527, 224 N. Y. Supp. 466 (Surr. CL 1927) ; Afatter of Gerbereux,
148 Misc. 461, 266 N. Y. Supp. 134 (Surr. Ct. 1933); Matter of Davison, 173 Misc. 323,
17 N. Y. S. 2d 790 (Surr. Ct. 1940), which cites a number of cases on the point.
72. Matter of Block, 186 Misc. 945, 60 N. Y. S. 2d 639 (Surr. Ct. 1946). There is a
suggestion to the same effect in Matter of Grossman, 157 Misc. 164, 283 N. Y. Supp. 323
(Surr. Ct. 1935). In Matter of Horowitz, 297 N. Y. 252, 79 N. E. 2d 593 (1948), the
court tacitly approved the receipt by an executor of a salary from the testators corporation
which was comparable to that paid while the testator was alive, but disallowed bonuses
and severance pay.
73. Matter of Gerbereux, 148 Misc. 461, 226 N. Y. S. Supp. 134 (Surr. Ct. 1933). The
testator had expressed a desire that his widow receive from his corporation the same salary
after his death that he had received, and the directors voted it. She was a trustee of the
estate. The salary was upheld.
74. Matter of Smythe, 36 N. Y. S. 2d 605 (Surr. Ct. 1942).
75. Matter of Horowitz, 297 N. Y. 252, 78 N. E. 2d 598 (1948).
76. In re Francis, 74 L. J. Ch. 487 (1905).
77. Rr.sTATrFxT, TRUSTS § 170, comment n. In a Maryland case, a trustee wvas elected
an officer of a corporation in which the estate had a one-half interest and was directed
to account to his estate for one-half of the salary he had received. Mangels v. Safe Deposit
& Trust Co. of Baltimore, 167 Md. 290, 173 Atl. 191 (1934).
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balance. But he may still face an income tax problem. One trust instru-
ment provided specifically that the trustees must pay over to the trust
all salaries which they received through their trust position. One trustee
who did so was later told by the Federal Court that he was nevertheless
liable for an income tax on the salary which he had turned over to his
trusty.
Miscellaneous Instances in Which the Rule against Divided Loyalty
Has Been Enforced
There may be a conflict of interest within different departments of a
corporate trustee. In one instance a trust company, as trustee, had the
right to invade the principal of a trust for the benefit of an income
beneficiary. The latter borrowed money from the commercial depart-
ment of the same bank, the lending officer relying on the powers of in-
vasion for reimbursement. The practice was disapproved as creating a
conflict of interest between the trust and the banking departments of
the trust company.
In another case, a threat by a trustee to violate the rule against divided
loyalty was sufficient to justify the court in removing him. A husband
had created a trust for his wife, making himself trustee and reserving
broad powers of management over the principal of the trust, including
the right to buy from and sell securities to himself, and to make unsecured
loans. Later, in the course of a dispute with his wife, he threatened to
make unsecured loans to himself. For this, he was removed." If a fidu-
ciary undertakes to buy an interest in an estate from a beneficiary of it,
he must impart to the latter all possible information concerning the estate,
and if he fails to do so, the purchase of the interest can be set aside.'
Where the testator had lent money to his own firm and made one of his
partners his executor, the latter allowed the loan to run at the same rate
of interest agreed upon with the testator. But the court told him that he
was not free as executor to contract either on this or on any matter with
the firm of which he was a partner."2
An executor who has been directed by a testator to continue the latter's
business may find the type of business to be a profitable one, but this
does not mean that he may go into the same business for his own
78. Comer v. Davis, 107 F. 2d 355 (C. C. A. 5th 1939).
79. Matter of Osborn, 252 App. Div. 438, 299 N. Y. Supp. 593 (2d Dep't 1937).
80. Carrier v. Carrier, 226 N. Y. 114, 123 N. E. 135 (1919).
81. Matter of Humpfner, 163 Misc. 91, 296 N. Y. Supp. 593 (Surr. Ct. 1937); Matter
of Rees, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 598 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
82. Matter of Meyers, 131 N. Y. 409, 30 N. E. 135 (1892).
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account, and compete with himself as executor. If he does, he will find
he must account to the estate for his individual profits. s3
WHEN THE "No FURTHER INQUImY" RULE Is NOT ENFORCED
The rule requiring a fiduciary to deal with his estate on the highest
possible level of honesty and good faith is based upon principles of justice
and is never relaxed, waived or ignored. It is susceptible of application
at all places and times.
The "no further inquiry" rule is of a different character. The procla-
mation in the illunson case that the court will not inquire into consider-
ations of abstract justice in a case involving a transaction between a fidu-
ciary and himself is pietistic rather than morally sound. It is understand-
able how it has caught popular fancy as a slogan and judicial clich6.
A feeling of self-righteousness and a glow of self-satisfaction, not too
far removed from smugness, are apt to accompany the denunciation of
ill-advised conduct on the part of others. But the rule is not universally
enforced, even by the courts which proclaim it, and this because the
abandonment of abstract justice, which is an abandonment of natural
law, is itself unnatural and unnatural results follow from it. The
"no further inquiry" rule is not a standard of conduct in itself but only
an aid to the enforcement of a standard. It should not be allowed to
dominate, and sometimes to discredit a doctrine which it was created
merely to serve.
It is by its own nature, an acknowledgment of weakness, as it is based
on the fear of an inability to determine the true rights of the parties
involved. This fear of course, may have been justified in 1886 when the
Munson opinion was written. At that time, the business empires of the
United States were in the making and some of their promoters were very
much "on the make". It may well have been difficult at the time to
establish proof of illegality or bad faith in financial transactions. But
today, with all the books and records which must be kept and with all
the powers of examination and of inspection which may be envoked,
neither the courts nor the parties are helpless. With the truth within
grasp, it should be sought and if possible obtained. There is no reason
why the abstract justice of a case should not at least be inquired into
in cases when the good faith of a fiduciary is established. Conflicts of
interest exist for any number of reasons, and in innumerable cases they
must be and are allowed to continue.
83. Matter of Offen, 45 N. Y. S. 2d 348 (Surr. CL 1943). The executor utilized the
estate's office and facilities for his own business as well. Other recent casses illustrating
miscellaneous violations of the rule against divided loyalty are Matter of Dawes, 12 N. Y. S.
2d 6 (Surr. Ct. 1939) ; Matter of Soss, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 23 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
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A universal example of a permitted conflict arises out of the fact that
the very nature of the laws governing estate administration forces a
fiduciary to occupy a position whereby he is in conflict with his trust
estate. A fiduciary is entitled to compensation for handling the funds
entrusted to his care and he is liable to surcharge for mishandling them.
As a result, two forms of conflict are created. Consider, as an illustration,
the case of an individual trustee who has received non-legal securities
from a testator and is not restricted with respect to their retention or
reinvestments. A compliance with the testator's wishes involves keeping
at least a part of the estate invested in non-legals. This in turn means
that the fiduciary must spend time and his own money in determining
what to retain, what and when to sell and what and when to buy. As an
alternative, he may sell the non-legal securities, and reinvest in govern-
ment bonds, thus reducing to a minimum the time and the personal funds
which have to be spent in administering the estate and the risk of sur-
charge. The conflict between the testator's wishes and the fiduciary's
own interest will continue to exist until the invention of a fiduciary who
has neither assets nor the will to acquire any and who can thus function
without hope of gain or fear of loss.
Another form of conflict of interest which is permitted to exist arises
out of the ownership by a fiduciary of securities in a corporation or other
entity in which he has his own financial interest. The rule against di-
vided loyalty is strictly enforced when the circumstances tend to
establish more than a mere possibility of a conflict of interest. Surrogate
Foley removed one trustee who invested estate funds in unissued pre-
ferred stock of a small corporation in which he had an interest as an
officer and stockholder.84 But the situation is different when the stocks
or bonds involved are those of large corporations and when the estate
funds do not flow to the company in which the trustee is interested
through the purchase of new securities but are utilized to purchase in
the open market securities already issued and outstanding.
Theoretically and sometimes actually, the value of any security is
affected favorably when it is purchased by others, and is affected un-
favorably when it is sold by others. It follows, therefore, that if a fidu-
ciary owns shares of General X Corporation for his individual account
and additional shares for his trust, he has placed himself in a position
where his private interests might conflict with his duties as a fiduciary.
His judgment as to retaining or selling the shares held by the trust may
be influenced by the effect of such a sale upon his own shares.
If the courts were to confine themselves to this sole factor, and bar a
fiduciary from owning as fiduciary any security whose retention or sale
84. Matter of Wohl, 36 N. Y. S. 2d 926 (Surr. Ct. 1942).
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might affect his individual interests, absurd results would follow, such
as removing any fiduciary who held government bonds both individually
and for his trust, or prohibiting a corporate fiduciary from owning as trus-
tee any security which it might hold for its individual account, either in its
portfolio or as collateral for a loan. The difficulty is to know where to
draw a line. For while it is easy to say that a fiduciary may not, on the
one hand, invest estate funds in a small corporation in which the fiduciary
has an interest but may on the other hand, purchase and hold govern-
ment bonds both individually and as trustee, there is the widest possible
combination of facts and circumstances between these two extremes. It
necessarily follows that the theoretical conflict which arises out of the
ownership of the same security by a fiduciary for his own account as
well as for his trust estate is not such a conflict as to invoke the "no
further inquiry" rule. An inquiry will be made into the facts and circum-
stances in order to determine if the fiduciary, in holding the same
securities for himself and for his estate, has violated the "punctilio of
an honor the most sensitive".,5
Supporters of the "no further inquiry" rule may argue that it was not
intended to apply to general situations, such as those arising out of the
nature of a fiduciary's Tight and obligations and mutual ownership of
widely distributed securities but only to limited sets of circumstances.
Yet conflicts in limited sets of circumstances are also permitted. It is
not unusual for a person to borrow money from the bank which he has
named as his executor and die with the debt unpaid. The executor forth-
with finds himself in a conflict of interest. As an executor, it owes money
to itself as a bank. In considering the question, the natural reaction is
to look at it from the standpoint of abstract justice. For instance, it is
the part of orderly administration for an executor to pay all debts, and
it may be held liable for failure to do so with sufficient promptness.80
And again, the debt has most probably been reduced to writing, so that
there will be little difficulty in establishing its amount and little doubt
as to its validity. But these and other pertinent factors are matters of
further inquiry, which would not be considered under the rule of the
Munson case. However, everyone is attracted to abstract justice by
natural law just as the apple is attracted to the ground by law of gravita-
tion, which may explain why the fact that an executor is also a creditor
of the testator is not in itself a reason for barring the executor from
qualifying or for removing him after he was qualified. 8T
85. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N. Y. 458, 464, 165 N. E. 545, 546 (1928).
86. As for example, Matter of Witkind, 167 Misc. 885, 4 N. Y. S. 2d 933 (Surr. Ct.
1938).
87. An actual, and not a theoretical, conflict is apt to appear if the debt is based on
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Another instance where the courts permit a fiduciary to occupy a
position in conflict with his duties is where the fiduciary has his own
interest in an estate. Quite often, an executor is a residuary legatee of
an estate88 and is not removed by reason of that fact. And in almost
every instance, an administrator is also a distributee since the law favors
as administrators those whose kinship make them distributees.8 9 It
should also be realized that although there is a well defined conflict in
interest between an income beneficiary of a trust, a trustee may have
an interest in either the income or the principal of a trust without
subjecting himself to removal for that reason per se.
The acceptance of some of these situations may be explained on the
grounds of implied waiver by the testatorY0 But it requires a stretch
of the imagination to construe a failure of a decedent to make a will
as an intended waiver of the rule against conflicting interests between
the distributee who becomes administrator and the other distributees.
In some instances the conflict of interest is permitted by statute.
Ordinarily, a trustee may not lend money to himself."1 But in New York,
a corporate fiduciary may lend money to itself by keeping estate funds
a collateral note and if a question exists as to the advisability of selling the collateral. The
distributees are apt to urge a postponement of sale if the market is falling. In Matter of
Stallo, 82 Misc. 135, 143 N. Y. Supp. 775 (Surr. Ct. 1913) the administrator, a bank, held
decedent's collateral note, and sold the collateral in spite of the objections of the family
who claimed that the bank had agreed to extend it. Surrogate Cohalan removed the ad-
ministrator saying, it was a "travesty on justice" to continue it in office when It appeared
that its interest was opposed to the interests of the estate. The Appellate Division reversed
on the ground that the Surrogate had not taken testimony and made findings of fact, as
required by § 2685 of the N. Y. Code of Civil Procedure, Matter of McDonald, 160 App.
Div. 86, 145 N. Y. Supp. 267 (1st Dep't 1914). The Court of Appeals affirmed, 211 N. Y.
272, 165 N. E. 407 (1914). The reversal on the grounds specified leaves in doubt the ques-.
tion whether the appellate courts ignored the "no further inquiry" doctrine or deemed it
subordinate to the statutory requirement that findings of fact must be made.
88. Illustrations of situations where there was an actual conflict between general legatees
and residuary legatees will be found in two opinions by Surrogate Delehanty. In Matter of
Stumpf, 153 Misc. 92, 274 N. Y. Supp. 466 (Surr. Ct. 1934), two of the three executors were
also residuary legatees. In Matter of James, 120 N. Y. L. J. 1695 (Surr. Ct. Dec. 30, 1948),
there was a close identity between the executors and the directors of the residuary legatee,
a charitable corporation.
89. N. Y. SURR. CT. ACT § 118.
90. In Matter of Cowen, 148 Misc. 35, 265 N. Y. Supp. 40 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
91. As an illustration, see Jonger v. First Trust & Deposit Co., 147 Misc. 260, 263 N.
Y. Supp. 619 (Sup. Ct. 1932). The trustees were given "absolute and uncontrolled discre-
tion" in administering the trust and at the express request of the grantor, made a loan to one
of the fiduciaries, the son-in-law of the grantor. As the trust was irrevocable, the request
had no value. The court said that "absolute and uncontrolled" discretion could not be exer-
cised in a transaction in which a fiduciary had his own interest.
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on deposit with itself, provided proper bookkeeping entries are made. 2
This is merely another illustration of the fact that a conflict of interests
is not evil in itself; it becomes evil only if principles of abstract justice
are violated. The risk is reduced to a minimum by reason of the statu-
tory preference given to estate accounts over ordinary accounts. 3 The
interest rate is also fixed by statute. 4 The statute follows the practice
sanctioned by the courts of this state over a long period of timeY3 The
Restatement of the Law of Trusts does not approve of deposit of estate
funds by a corporate fiduciary with itself,"' which is somewhat incon-
sistent with the recognized right of a corporate fiduciary to exercise
uncontrolled custody of negotiable securities or other readily saleable
assets of an estate.
Another conflict of interest permitted for a time by statute allowed a
trust company to purchase a mortgage in its own name, and thereafter
allocate shares in it to its trusts, provided it gave prompt notice to each
adult income beneficiary."1 The practice had received prior judicial
sanction. 8 The permission was revoked nineteen years after it had
been granted. Although the losses on mortgage participations were se-
vere after 1931, they were due primarily to the collapse in real estate
values which commenced in 1930 or 1931 although there were also cases
of "unloading."'"
92. N. Y. B.WN G LAW § 100 (b).
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Herzog v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 148 App. Div. 234, 132 N. Y. Supp. 1114
(1st Dep't 1911), modified on other grounds and aff'd, 210 N. Y. 531, 103 N. E. 885 (1913);
Matter of Haigh, 133 Iisc. 240, 232 N. Y. Supp. 322 (Surr Ct. 1928) ; Matter of Peoples
Trust Co., 169 App. Div. 699, 155 N. Y. Supp. 639 (2d Dep't 1915); Matter of Sudds, 32
Misc. 182, 66 N. Y. Supp. 231 (Surr. CL 1900); Matter of Johnson, 57 App. Div. 494,
67 N. Y. Supp. 1004, modified on other grounds, 170 N. Y. 139, 63 N. E. 63 (1902).
96. RESTATEMN T, TRUSTS § 170, Comment in (1935).
97. N. Y. Laws, 1917, c. 385.
98. Matter of Union Trust Co., 219 N. Y. 514, 114 N. E. 1057 (1916).
99. N. Y. Laws, 1936, c. 898.
100. Since the practice of selling mortgage participations to trusts is no longer per-
mitted, it will not be discussed at any further length. With respect to mortgage participa-
tions still held in any trust, it should be remembered:
A-The statute permitted the sale of participations in a mortgage but not of an entire
mortgage. Matter of Ryan, 291 N. Y. 376, 52 N. E. 2d 909 (1943).
B-Failure to give notice invalidates the transaction in its entirety. Matter of Ryan,
291 N. Y. 376, 52 N. E. 2d 909 (1943).
C-A guardian of an infant income beneficiary is entitled to notice and failure to notify
him is a failure to comply with the statute. Matter of Beams, 251 App. Div. 222, 295
N. Y. Supp. 618 (1st Dep't 1937), aff'd sub norm. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 276 N. Y.
590, 12 N. E. 2d 590 (1937).
D---'Prompt" notice has been held to include notice given eighteen months after the
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It will not take much thought to bring to mind other situations in which
fiduciaries occupy positions which are theoretically in conflict with their
duties or which may be in conflict with them and which are nevertheless
accepted as proper. The estate continues to be protected because any
real breach of abstract justice will be punished. The difficulty which
confronts fiduciaries and their counsel is that the "no further inquiry"
rule is still very much alive and no one can tell when it will be envoked.
Seeming judicial acquiescence in a practice over a long period of time
is no protection as is evidenced by the history of the cases on the right
of a corporate fiduciary to administer its own stock.
SITUATIONS IN WHICH THE INTEREST OF THE TRUST ESTATE SUGGEST
THAT THE RULE AGAINST DIVIDED LOYALTY SHOULD BE WAIVED
One of the self-condemning defects of the "no further inquiry" rule
is that its enforcement may operate to injure the estate which the rule
was designed to protect. Consequently, draftsmen should consider care-
fully whether a conflict of interest may arise between a fiduciary and his
trust estate, and if so, whether the rule against divided loyalty should
not be waived, not for the benefit of the fiduciary but for the benefit
of the trust estate. Such a waiver need not be an over-all one. It may be
limited to particular situations in which the interests of the estate and
the preservation of the testamentary intention need protection against the
holding in the Munson case and the "no further inquiry" rule.
It is important to realize that a waiver of the rule against divided
loyalty is in no sense a waiver of the high standard of conduct demanded
of fiduciaries. They remain "nevertheless bound to exercise this power
(of self-dealing) in the best of faith and to evince the highest degree
of disinterestedness, loyalty and honor."'' A waiver operates only to the
extent of requiring the court to inquire into the abstract justice of the
particular case and decide it upon its merits rather than on a slogan.
Thus, a fiduciary who has been given the broadest powers to buy and sell
securities from and to a firm in which he is interested is in no sense free
to enrich himself by fixing his own prices. He must adhere to market
values on all transactions and the profits or compensation must be the
transaction, but before any default. Matter of Dodge, 39 N. Y. S. 2d 186 (Surr. Ct. 1943),
aff'd, 266 App. Div. 845, 43 N. Y. S. 2d 512 (1st Dep't 1943).
E-The "notice" need not be a formal one, but seemingly will include anything found
in any statement or paper sent by the trustee to an income beneficiary that can possibly
be construed as notice. The test of Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y. 439, 443, 154 N. E. 303,
304 (1926), as to "laying bare the truth without ambiguity or reservation with all its stark
significance" is ignored in its. entirety.
101. Heyman v. Heyman, 33 N. Y. S. 2d 235, 241 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
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usual and customary ones. 10 2 In other words, the waiver serves only to
give him the same rights he would have if he were not the fiduciary.
The waiver, moreover, will be strictly construed. One trustee was allowed
to engage in self-dealing on the purchase and sale of securities and was
also allowed to make unsecured loans, but the court held he could not
add the two powers together so as to make unsecured loans to himself.,0'
The very fact that a testator allows fiduciaries to occupy conflicting
positions means that they will be held to exact special standards of
fiduciary conduct.' 04 While a waiver of the rule against self-dealing
will be upheld, the courts will not permit themselves to be deprived by
exculpatory clauses from exercising their jurisdiction over the administra-
tion of the trust.' Consequently, defenders of the "no further in-
quiry" rule, if they are any, cannot argue that the lifting of it whether
in whole or in part will result in the looting of estates. The fiduciary
will continue to be answerable for his conduct, and if anything, bound by
a higher standard of principles.
Obviously, it would be impossible to enumerate all the sets of circum-
stances under which a waiver of the rule against self-dealing might be
advisable. But a few illustrations may be in order, based upon reported
decisions, and upon hypothetical but practical and ordinary situations.
For example, it appeared in one decided case0" that the testator had
owned 80% of the stock of a corporation of which he was president. The
remaining 20%o of the stock was owned by his associates. In order that
the company might enjoy sufficient working capital, he had allowed
his salary and dividends on his stock to remain unpaid so that when he
died, the corporation owned him $145,000.00. The testator appointed
as his trustees, men who were officers or stockholders in the corpora-
tion. They reduced the debt to about $100,000.00 and administered the
balance as if it were a funded asset of the estate. In keeping the money
in the business, they were following the policy which the testator himself
had inaugurated, and the court found that they acted in good faith.
The trustees, however, were occupying a position of conflicting inter-
ests. As trustees, they held a claim against the corporation in which
they were personally interested. They had no protection under the
will, either to retain the claim against the corporation as an asset or
to deal with themselves, and the court had to direct them to pay off the
debt. Perhaps in this particular case, the loan was paid without im-
102. Ibid.
103. Carrier v. Carrier, 226 N. Y. 114, 123 N. E. 135 (1919).
104. Matter of James, 120 N. Y. L. J. 1695 (Surr. Ct. Dec. 30, 1948).
105. Heyman v. Heyman, 33 N. Y. S. 2d 235 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
106. Matter of Keane, 95 Misc. 25, 160 X. Y. Supp. 200 (Surr. Ct. 1916).
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pairing the value of the stock of the corporation which was owned by
the estate. But it is easy to conceive of circumstances where forcing a
small corporation to pay a debt of this character, which the testator did
not wish to have paid, would either destroy or substantially impair the
value of the estate's equity in the corporation. A testator owes it to his
beneficiaries to see to it that his fiduciaries may exercise judgment and
discretion, free from the burden of operating under the judicial threat
that they will not be allowed to defend their actions.
In another case,1 7 the testator was in partnership with his brother
under an agreement which provided machinery for valuing the assets of
the business upon the death of either partner for the purpose of liqui-
dating the interest of the deceased partner in the assets of the firm. The
testator made his brother one of his trustees. The inevitable happened.
The widow disagreed with the brother as to the method of valuing the
assets; the brother's conflicting interests were obvious and because a
conflict existed, he was removed. The "no further inquiry" rule was en-
forced at the expense of frustrating the testamentary intent that the
brother function as a trustee. If the testator had waived the rule
against divided loyalty, the brother could have continued as trustee, and
his appraisal of the assets of the partnership would have been measured
by "the highest degree of disinterestedness, loyalty and honor." 0 8
Of course, these cases could have been decided differently by apply-
ing the doctrine of an implied waiver of the rule against divided loyalty.
This was done in the one case0 9 where the testator created a trust and
gave the trustees power to invade the principal for the benefit of the in-
come beneficiary. The testator then proceeded to make one of his trus-
tees a remainderman of the trust, thus placing him in a position where
any invasion of principal would in effect come out of his own pocket.
The testator should have waived expressly the rule against divided
loyalty which was automatically created. The court however did
it for him, to the extent of denying the application of the income bene-
ficiary to remove the trustee, ruling that it was the testator and not the
fiduciary who was responsible for the situation.
Another instance in which the rule against divided loyalty may well be
waived is where it appears that a fiduciary may live in a building which
is a part of the trust estate. The waiver need go no further than to au-
thorize the fiduciary to occupy the conflicting relationship of landlord
and tenant."0 If he charges himself too little rent, the waiver will not
107. Matter of Keller, 142 App. Div. 454, 127 N. Y. Supp. 16 (1st Dep't 1911).
108. Heyman v. Heyman, 33 N. Y. S. 2d 235, 241 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
109. Matter of Cowen, 148 Misc. 35, 265 N. Y. Supp. 40 (Surr. Ct. 1933).
110. In Matter of Hubbell, 119 N. Y. L. J. 554 (Surr. Ct. Feb. 11, 1948), a waiver was
implied.
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interfere in the slightest degree with the right of a court to fix a proper
rent.
The waiver of the rule against divided loyalty may become highly
advisable in circumstances where a testator or settlor of a trust wishes to
appoint a salaried associate or employee as a trustee. The Pyle case held
that since a conflict of interest exists when a trustee becomes a salaried
officer of the corporation whose stock he holds as trustee, a trustee who
accepts such a salary is liable to removal." This may have been modi-
fied by the recent Horowitz case"12 which tacitly approved the acceptance
by a trustee of the same salary which he was receiving when the testator
died. But since the court disapproved the bonus and severance pay given
to the fiduciary in the Horowitz case without discussing the circumstances
or the merits of the payments, it would seem that the compensation of an
employee named as a fiduciary must be frozen at the level as of the date
of death. This, of course, might well serve to persuade the employee
named as a fiduciary to relinquish either his position as fiduciary or as
employee or both, particularly if the employee. was young with increasing
earning power ahead of him. He might well decide that the statutory
compensation of a trustee was far less attractive than the salary in-
creases which he might obtain if not tied down by the "no further
inquiry" rule.
Consequently, a testator contemplating appointing a salaried employee
or a partner or fellow corporate officer as a fiduciary of his estate should
consider carefully the advisability of waiving the rule against divided
loyalty. If he elects to do so, he will not be taking any great risk. If
the fiduciary employs his trust powers to vote himself an excessive salary,
the courts are always available to protect the trust estate.
If the testator prefers, he may grant a limited waiver of the rule
against divided loyalty to the extent of providing that one fiduciary may
engage in self-dealing with the approval of co-fiduciaries having no per-
sonal interest in the transaction. This would get away from the present
doctrine, also derived from the Munson case, that all fiduciaries are
equally liable in a transaction of self-dealing in which only one has an
interest, on the theory that the court will not undertake to measure the
influence that one fiduciary may have over his fellow fiduciaries. This
makes some sense in a corporate transaction where one director, through
his stock interests, may cause to be elected to serve with him a group
who will be subservient to him. But it has nothing to commend it in an
111. Pyle v. Pyle, 137 App. Div. 568, 573, 122 N. Y. Supp. 256, 260 (1st Dep't 1910),
aff'd, 199 N. Y. 538, 92 N. E. 1099 (1910).
112. Matter of Horowitz, 297 N. Y. 252, 78 N. E. 2d 598 (1948).
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estate where the testator or the settlor of a trust has selected his own
fiduciaries.113
In situations where one of several fiduciaries is also a salaried em-
ployee of a corporation, shares of stock of which are held by the trust
estate, the testator may wish to provide that the stock shall be voted only
by those fiduciaries who are not employees. Such a provision would be
along the lines of the federal statute restricting the right of a national
bank to vote at elections of its own directors, such shares of its own stock
as it may hold as trustee."'
It should be again emphasized that a waiver of the rule against divided
loyalty is in no sense an invitation to a fiduciary to loot his estate nor
is it even giving him an opportunity to do so with impunity. For it does
not lower in the minutest degree the standards of conduct imposed upon
the fiduciary. They continue to be of the highest and they will continue
to be enforced by alert courts in exacting fashion. The waiver of the
rule will merely substitute the application of principles of abstract justice
for an arbitrary refusal to inquire into justice.
The "no further inquiry" rule is so firmly entrenched in our law that
its revocation should come from the legislature and not the courts, unless
the doctrine of "stare decisis" is to be further weakened. Admittedly,
it will take some courage to make the change. The rule sounds so plaus-
ible; it appears to be so noble of purpose; it rings with such honesty.
It has everything except the ability to resist analysis. It is pleasing as
rhetoric, but it is bad law, as is any law, statutory or judge-made, which
establishes a policy rather than abstract justice as the standard of in-
dividual guilt. It has not even the justification of necessity, if necessity
can ever justify a bad law. Both statutes"' and well established judicial
doctrines will protect an estate against actual wrong-doing." 0 If further
protection is needed, it can be obtained through the establishment of a
rule that the burden of proof as to the fairness of any transaction between
113. In Matter of Berri, 130 Misc. 527, 224 N. Y. Supp. 466 (Surr. Ct. 1927), one of tile
grounds for permitting a fiduciary to accept a salary was that his co-fiduciaries who voted
in favor of it had been selected by the testator and that the salaried fiduciary had no part
in their selection.
114. REv. STAT. § 5144 (1875), as amiended, 49 STAT. 704, 710 (1935), 12 U. S. C. § 61
(1940).
115. Sec. 111 (2) Decedent Estate Law and § 21 (2) Personal Property Law provide
that "no trustee shall purchase securities here under from himself."
116. The numerous cases examined in connection with the preparation of this article
indicate that there are no signs that the high standards of conduct imposed upon fiduciaries
are being subjected to the "disintegrating erosion" that Judge Cardozo referred to in
Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y. 439, 154 N. E. 303 (1929).
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a fiduciary and his estate, not already prohibited by statute, is upon
the fiduciary.
The important thing is to recall principles of abstract justice from
the exile to which they were condemned by the opinion in the Miunson
case. No doctrine of law which affirmatively and almost gleefully dis-
claims interest in the abstract justice of any case has a place in American
jurisprudence.
